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University of Pennsylvania Law Review

RECEIVED

3400 Chestnut Street

NOV 12 1992

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6204
Telephone 215-898-7060
Facsimile 215-573-2005

November 5, 1992

ROGER J. MINER
U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE

ALBANY NEW YORK

Martin Mazen Anbari
Editor-in-Chief

The Honorable Roger J. Miner
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
P.O. Box 858
Albany, NY 12201
Dear Judge Miner:
I am delighted to hear from Peter Flocos that you have
agreed to speak at our 1993 annual banquet and that one of our
suggested dates, March 25, is agreeable to you.
I write on behalf of the Editorial Board of the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review to extend to you a formal invitation.
We will be honored to have you speak at the banquet.
Attendance at the banquet is by invitation only and has
traditionally included editors and alumni of the Law Review and
members of the Law School faculty and the Philadelphia Bar.
over the next few weeks, the Law Review will be making the final
arrangements for the banquet; we will keep you posted.
The Law Review will of course reimburse for all the expenses
that you might incur in visiting Philadelphia. As the time of
the banquet draws near, our Managing Editor, Keith Eisner, will
be in contact with your office to arrange for your travel and
overnight stay.
In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance in answering
questions related to the Law Review and the banquet, please
contact me at the Law Review.
Thank you very much.

Martin Mazen Anbari
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Roger J. Miner
U.S. Circuit Judge
7Sth Anniversary Dinner
Cornell Law Review
Statler Hotel, Ithaca, NY
March a, 1990
7:00 P.M.
I salute the editors, staff, alumni and faculty advisors of
the Cornell Law Review on 75 years of distinguished service to
the legal community.

Since it began publication in 1915, your

law review has acquired an outstanding reputation, nationally and
internationally, for the publication of articles, notes and
comments on the cutting edge of the law.

Accurate, timely, well-

researched and well-edited, the pieces published in this law
review are a tribute to the editors and staff as well as to the
authors.

I know from personal experience that those able

analyses, dynamic discussions, and comprehensive critiques by the
contributing authors would never see the light of day without the
significant student contributions essential to the publication of
each issue.
My personal experience was as a Managing Editor, a position
, that I regard, naturally, as the most important on the staff.
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I recall the lead article of my first issue as Managing Editor.

~~ I~ was

written by that great lion of American law, Roscoe Pound,

then Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School.
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The

artjcle,~titled

"The Judicial Process in Action,".came to us in a form all too
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familiar to law review staffers-- all messed up, and with much
cite and substance work required./ "The Judicial Process in
Action" --I have returned to 2ha article time and time again
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years -- not because it has always remained

interesting, informative and timely -- not because it has
provided me with valuable insights bearing on my work as a judge
-- and not because it is a great classic of legal literature.y"I
have returned to that article repeatedly over the course of
decades because I never have understood the damn

thing~

~

More

about the problem of understanding law review articles shortly.
Incidently, there is a quote from one of Pound's books behind the
bench in the Cornell Moot Courtroom:
it cannot stand still."

"Law must be stable and yet

I understand it but do not consider it

especially profound.

1$Ji-. also remember the first student note I was responsible for
editing.

The note seems strangely out of date, since it revolved

(

around a 1954 ruli.· n.9 •of a c. oo.k County, Illinois Superior Court to
1~ }._l-;L· ~
~<1-- ~ ,J.... ~1
~the effect that artit14f3l=tJ::minatiot:1 of a wite.by--a man other
?
-,
than her~.b
baanndd cccons.tiitt1uted aqultery and thft,.~he resulting
1~· ~ ~~ ~ /.-\,_...,..,.._ ""-.. ~~ ,;.c_~-.r~
child was illegitimate.A The note has stuck in my mind all these
\.

years because I remember the first line of the piece as it was
handed in.

It read:

"Artificial insemination has only lately

come into the public eye."

I immediately saw the need for some

editing on the first lineJ
According to the Cornell Law School catalogue, "[t]he
[Cornell Law] Review offers training and experience in legal
researching, critical analysis and concise writing."

It is no

secret that judges, especially of the federal variety, value
these skills very highly and invariably hire as their clerks
2

·

people who have served on law reviews.

Among my colleagues in

the Second Circuit, Cornell Law Review members enjoy excellent
reputations for their superior scholarship as well for their
writing, analytical and research skills.

However, I pause here

to dispel the widely-held but totally erroneous belief that
federal judges could not perform their duties without law clerks.
Although clerks are very helpful to a judge, it would be foolish
for one with 35 years of experience to accept without question
the expertise of one who recently completed three years of law
school.

When asked how much I rely on the work of clerks, I

always remind the questioner of the Biblical story of Methuselah.
The Bible says that, at the end of his days, Methuselah "leaned
on his staff and died."
Besides the honing of research, analytical and writing
skills, law review membership brings with it the experience of
collegiality--the opportunity to work with others toward a common
goal.

This is an important experience, valuable to those who

would work in a judge's chambers or in a law firm or in any other
legal environment where teamwork is essential.

Not the least

important part of the collegiality of a law review is the
friendship of your fellow staffers.

some of my colleagues from

law review are still my dearest friends, even after all the time
that has passed.

So will it be with many of you.

I am told that there is some interest here in the extent to
which use is made of law reviews in the decisionmaking process,
particularly in the Federal Appellate decisionmaking process.
3

I

can only speak from my own experience in this regard.

In my

chambers, we always check to see whether there are any law review
articles, notes or comments dealing with the subject of the
decisions we are working on.

Very often, authors are kind enough

to send us reprints of their articles when they see that we are
considering a case to which their article bears some relevance.
As I noted earlier, the law clerks ordinarily are law review
alumni and are in close contact with the law review scene.

I

like to thumb through the major law reviews when I have the
opportunity.

We often cite to law reviews.

But we find them

most useful as compendia--exhaustive and comprehensive
collections of cases and statutes on particular subjects.

I find

the analyses, conclusions and suggested directions interesting
but rely on the reviews much less for those purposes.

I find the

authors' conclusions, very often, off the wall, away from the
mainstream and unpersuasive.

But keep them coming!

Very interesting to me are law review analyses of decisions
I have written.

Not too many authors agree with me when they

write about my decisions.

Either I am wrong most of the time or

there is some rule against agreeing with a judge.

I often feel

like a playwright who gets bad reviews, and I frequently scribble
on the articles words like "that's not what I said" or "that's
not what the case holds."

Two years ago, I wrote a decision in a

Title VII sex discrimination case brought by a man who claimed
that he was denied promotion to the position of supervising
respiratory therapist because the man in charge of hiring at the
4

hospital preferred the female with whom he was having a romantic
relationship.

I wrote for a unanimous panel that plaintiff had

not been discriminated against on the basis of his sex within the
meaning of Title VII.

The professor who wrote a 51 page law

review article entitled "The Meaning of •sex' in Title VII:

Is

Favoring an Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?" apparently
agreed with my conclusion but not with the way I got there.

She

constructed in her article a "process-oriented framework" for
dealing with such cases, including what she called a
"reconstructed prima facie case" approach.

It was all very

elaborate, rich and interesting, but I cannot perceive any
practical use for the analysis.
But law reviews are not only for judges and academics.

They

are important to the practicing bar and to those responsible for
the formulation of legislation.

The need for the journals to be

useful to those segments of the profession ought always to be
borne in mind.

Most useful to all branches of the profession

were some articles appearing in recent issues of a leading law
review and dealing with such diverse subjects as the right to
confrontation in co-defendant confession cases; the definition of
religion in the first amendment; the "work for hire" provision in
the Copyright Act; and the regulation of secondary trading
markets.

The same leading journal, however, in an issue that

included a very worthwhile article on the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
provided an essay on "the influence of emotions under a
retributive theory of punishment."
5

I read in full the conclusion

to, that 55 page article:
(

\
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Like most fields of thought, the law has developed its own vocabulary for expressing concepts and promoting values. The language of law is the language of rationality, of the cool and the
deliberative. While this insistence upon rationalistic expression has
general merit in the elucidation of critical issues, in some instances
it obscures more than it reveals. Where, as in criminal punishment,
the influence of emotions is too fundamental to ignore or entirely
condemn, the law's vocabulary requires expansion to permit emotive discourse.
Bringing emotions into legal discourse has its risk. We must
take care that decisionmakers' personal, nonmoral inclinations do
not substitute for legal principles in the resolution of controversies.
Thus, where we can devise rules sufficiently determinate to minimize emotional influence, we should do so. When we reach the limits oflaw, when we enter those areas where rules lose their power to
direct us toward just results, however, recognition of and struggle
with emotional influence becomes necessary. In these mysterious
places we need to reconcile thoughts and feelings.
In the seventeenth century Blaise Pascal wrote in his Pensees:
"La coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connait [pas.]" 178 The
heart has its reasons, which reason knows not. In our everyday lives
we know what is right not only because we think it, but because we
feel it. It is our challenge as lawyers to make the law see the sense of
that insight.
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178 B. PASCAL. PENSEES 343 (H.F. Stewart ed. 1950). Pascal also wrote: ''Two ex~
cesses: to exclude reason. ro admit nothing but reason." PENSEES 85. ~ 183 (A. Krail~
sheimer trans. 1966).

This is from volume 74 of the Cornell Law Review, of course,
and I would sum up the article in this way:

the influence of

emotion in criminal punishment is good and bad.
those last two sentences?

But how about

"In our everyday lives we know what is

right not only because we think it, but because we feel it.

It

is our challenge to make the law see the sense of that insight."
I do not understand those two sentences.

The author challenges

us "to make the law see the sense of (an] insight."

I would like

to accept the challenge, but I do not know what it is.
I suggest that much of what is written in law reviews is
unintelligible, and what is not unintelligible is boring and
repetitious to the point of stupefaction.

If I see the word

"normative" in one more law review article, I shall scream!

This

leads me to a subject of deep interest to me, and I hope to you
-- the communication crisis in the legal profession.

I have been

concerned for many years with the fact that lawyers of every
variety are becoming more and more unintelligible

to their

clients, to the courts, to the general public and to each other.
I even have written, and hopefully will be forgiven for, a law
review article to be published shortly on the subject.

It is

called "Confronting the Communication Crisis in the Legal
Profession."
I think that the legal profession merely reflects a
communication crisis in the general society.

A few days ago, the

New York Times reported on the failure of communication between
physician and patient.

Our public discourse frequently seems to
7

consist of euphemisms.

Consider these examples, collected from

recent newspaper reports:

*

Doctors at a Philadelphia hospital described a patient's

death as a "diagnostic misadventure of a high magnitude."

*

Five thousand workers at a Chrysler plant found out that

a new "career alternative enhancement program" meant their plant
was closing and they were out of jobs.

*

A stockbroker described the October 13th, 1987 stock

market crash as a "fourth quarter eauity retreat."

*

A United States Senator referred to capital punishment as

"our society's recognition of the sanctity of human life."
What I do not understand is why lawyers tolerate doubletalk
and inarticulateness in speech and writing.

Twenty years ago,

the National District Attorneys Association, of which I was then
a member, held its annual conference in New York City.

During

the conference, we had a luncheon speaker who was introduced as a
member of the United Nations legal staff specializing in criminal
matters.
artist.

I recognized him as a local comedian and doubletalk
About ten minutes into his meaningless spiel, a

prosecutor from Georgia sitting next to me leaned over and said:
"Ah cain't understand a lot of what thet ol' feller is sayin'."
I replied:

"You can't understand anything of what he is saying,

because he is speaking doubletalk."

"Isn't that somethin'?" he

said, "Ah just tho't he had a real bad New York accent."
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly
and easily understood, much of the written and oral expression of
8

the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the
definition.

Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of

the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a
crisis.

It deserves our attention because the effective

transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is
essential to the efficient operation of our legal system.
Ineffective expression in legal discourse diminishes the service
of the bar, impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal
progress and growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law.
The expressive deficiencies of lawyers in their capacities as
counselors, litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators
must be recognized as a serious and growing problem.
The attorney as counselor is constrained to communicate with
clients, colleagues and government agencies.

Communication with

clients -- to keep the client informed about the status of a
case: to comply with requests for information; and to provide an
explanation of matters sufficient to permit the client to make
informed decisions -- is an ethical obligation.

Yet, failure to

communicate is near the top of the list of complaints made by
clients about their lawyers.

Very frequently, an irreparable

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship is occasioned by a
lawyer's neglect to impart necessary information to a client
clearly and promptly.

Client communication is not merely a

device for reassuring the client or avoiding fee disputes; it is
the sine gya non of the service provided by the attorney as
counselor.
9

Much ink has been spilled in the effort to promote the use
of plain English by lawyers.

Despite all the criticism directed

at legalese, however, attorneys continue to employ arcane legal
language when counseling clients.

rt is no wonder that clients

rate lawyers as ineffective communicators and, according to
surveys, generally will select one lawyer over another on the
basis of ability to communicate rather than technical competence.
An

all-too-typical example of attorney-client communication

failure recently surfaced in a New York city newspaper report of
a pending defamation action brought by a well-known comedian.
According to the report, the defendant in the case, when
questioned at a deposition about his $10 million counterclaim for
services allegedly rendered under a management agreement, said:
"I don't know what it says and I don't understand it. 11

The

immediate result of that testimony was the withdrawal of the
counterclaim, but the long-term result was to reinforce public
skepticism of the ability of lawyers to communicate.
The inarticulateness of the bar has brought us to the point
where law firms must hire public relations counsel, "media
advisers," "image makers," to speak to the public for them and to
advise them on how to deal with the press.

There was a time when

some people would refer to a lawyer as a "mouthpiece."

How

surprised they would be to hear a "mouthpiece" speak through
someone else!

One must wonder whether the time is far off when

an attorney will counsel clients through the medium of a
"communicator."
10

The widespread use of legal jargon in discourse with clients
is sometimes attributed to bad motives on the part of the bar -escalation of fees, self-promotion and deception.

One

commentator has posited "[i]nertia, incompetence, status, power,
cost and risk" as "a formidable set of motivations to keep
legalese."

My own experience has been that only inertia and

incompetence drive the excessive use of lawyerisms and legalese
in counseling clients and drafting legal instruments.

Inertia is

represented by the use of the same forms, form books, buzz words,
precedent, methods and practices over the years.

Incompetence in

expression now permeates the profession because of deficiencies
in the early education of young lawyers.

Modern education seems

to provide an insufficient foundation in English grammar, style
and usage.

As a law teacher, I have been astounded by some of

the inadequacies in written and oral expression demonstrated by
the brightest students.

It should come as no surprise to

educators that lawyers increasingly are unable to communicate
with clients.
The communication skills of those who initiate lawyer-tolawyer transmissions also have been found wanting in recent
years, especially in respect of legal memoranda for internal law
firm use.

The lack of directness and excessive formalism of

expression that characterize poorly written correspondence as
well as inadequate legal memos are said to be especially apparent
among young lawyers.

Elimination of "incomprehensible muddles"

in lawyer-to-lawyer discourse will facilitate the work of
11

counselors and redound to the benefit of clients.
Essential to every litigator is clarity of speech in
courtroom discourse.

Yet trial judges frequently are heard to

complain of the inability of courtroom lawyers to communicate
with witnesses, juries and the bench itself.
The stilted language of the law has no place, of course, in
the questioning of witnesses or in the persuasion of juries.

In

my opinion, the expressive deficiencies noted in trial lawyers
are for the most part simply attributable to their lack of trial
experience.
Inexperienced litigators frequently have communication
problems during the direct examination of witnesses because they
are unable to pose a question that will elicit an answer relevant
and material to the case or because they just confuse the
witness.

Take these actual examples collected by a Court

Reporter:

12

Q.
A.

Doctor, did you say he was shot in the woods?
No, I said he was shot in the lumbar region.

Q.
A.
Q.

Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage
terminated?
By death.
And by whose death was it terminated?

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What is your name?
Ernestine McDowell.
And what is your marital status?
Fair.

Q.
A.
A.

What happened then?
He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because
you can identify me."
Did he kill you?
No.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are you married?
No, I am divorced.
What did your husband do before you divorced him?
A lot of things that I didn't know about.

Q.

At the time you first saw Dr. McCarthy, had you
ever seen him prior to that time?

Q.

Now I am going to show you what has been marked as
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize
the picture.
John Fletcher.
That's you?
Yes, sir.
And you were present when the picture was taken,
right?

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant
to a subpoena which was served upon you?
No. This is how I dress when I go to work.
And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral.
Okay? What school do you go to?
Oral.
How old are you?
oral.

As a long-time observer of the litigation scene, it seems to
me that the communication crisis has affected appellate advocacy
even more than trial advocacy.

Appellate advocacy comes in two

parts -- Briefs and Oral Arguments -- and its sole object is the
persuasion of appellate judges.

In my experience, it is the rare

briefwriter who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity,
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a
Brief with maximum persuasive force.
If there is a failure of communication in brief-writing,
there is an even greater failure in the other part of appellate
advocacy

oral argument.

While litigators will engage in the

most meticulous preparations for trial, it often seems that the
same attorneys have not prepared at all for the argument of an
(

'c

appeal.

Among the best oral communicators I have heard are law

students in appellate moot court competitions that I have judged.
The students express themselves effectively because they are
prepared to do so by reason of study and practice.

Deficiency in

oral expression is more and more noticeable as most litigators,
ignoring the opportunity to engage in a Socratic dialogue with
the judges about their cases, approach oral argument as if they
really would have preferred to "submit."

It is still a great

pleasure to see and hear the interchange between British
barristers and the appeals court judges before whom they argue.
That interchange is characterized by a clarity of expression that
is the envy of American appellate judges.
Those who adjudicate controversies need to communicate with
13

various audiences.

Judges who preside at trials must express

themselves in a way that can be understood by counsel, witnesses
and the parties appearing before them.

Appellate judges must be

clear and concise in their questions during oral argument and
must render written opinions that are comprehensible as
resolutions of disputes at hand and as precedents for future
cases.

Magistrates, referees, administrative law judges,

arbitrators, special masters, examiners and all those who perform
adjudicatory functions of any kind must bring perspicuity to
their endeavors.
Of all the communicative functions of the trial judge, jury
instruction is probably the most important and the most
difficult.

Jury comprehension studies generally confirm that

jurors do not understand many of the instructions given to them.
Efforts have been undertaken to draft pattern jury instructions
that will be meaningful to jurors.

Other experiments have been

conducted in an effort to improve juror comprehension, including
the use of tape recordings and the furnishing of written copies
of the charge.

Much more remains to be done but, in the final

analysis, jury comprehension of the court's instructions is the
responsibility of the judge instructing.

Judges of course must

express fairness and impartiality in both speech and demeanor
when presiding at trials, and that expression represents the
ultimate communication of the trial judge.
It is the written opinion in which the skills of the
adjudicator find their most perfect (or imperfect) expression.
14

According to one teacher of judicial writing, adjudicators share
common goals in desiring their written opinions "to be clear,
concise, precise and complete, fair, reasonable, just, balanced
and dignified" in order to serve a number of purposes:

"to

decide, dispose of and record cases; persuade, exhort, order,
teach, inform, explain and reason with audiences ranging in legal
expertise from litigants and the media to courts of appellate
review."

A tall order indeed!

As a communicator, the

adjudicator can do no better than to remember Justice Cardozo's
admonition that the "sovereign virtue for the judge is
clearness."

I have formulated my own admonition:

Simplify,

clarify and edify in all forms of legal expression.
Those in the legal profession whose responsibility it is to
formulate and draft legislation often are faulted for fuzziness
of language.

Indeed, every lawyer has had to wrestle, at one

time or another, with statutes, especially of the tax variety,
that are tantamount to incomprehensible.
It seems beyond cavil, however, that legislative bodies know
what plain English is.

Many states have adopted laws requiring

the use of plain English in consumer contracts, insurance
policies and similar documents; Congress itself has adopted a
number of statutes containing plain English requirements.
It can be said that legislator-lawyers have, by attention to
plain language laws affecting consumers, recognized the depth of
the communication crisis more than any other branch of the
profession.

We can only hope that this concern for plain
15

language will extend to other types of legislation as well.
Law students comprise the primary audience for legal
educators.

The secondary audience is comprised of the practicing

bar, other academics and the general public, including those
interested in the books and learned articles of law professors.
There is evidence of a growing estrangement between the
professors and their primary audience.

Some law teachers are

becoming less interested in teaching professional skills and
professional subjects than in interdisciplinary studies and other
academic pursuits.

A recent newspaper dispatch described a

certain law professor as "one of the most sought-after legal
academics in the country" by reason of his expertise in dispute
management in Medieval Icelandic society.
But even more serious than the failure of the professors to
communicate with their students is their failure to teach
communication.

Thus do law students fail to acquire the oral and

written skills necessary for the survival of the profession.
Comprehension also suffers.

A government agency recently

published a notice of legal positions available to recent law
graduates.

The notice required the submission of writing samples

with the applications for employment.

A large number of

applications were accompanied by handwriting samples.

The

misuse, abuse, and incomprehensibility of language represents a
true crisis for us, because language is, after all, the medium in
which the profession conducts its business.
The bar is constrained to communicate with such diverse
16

audiences as clients, colleagues, judges, witnesses, juries,
administrative bodies, law students, academicians and the public
at large.

Of-the deterioration of the abilities of lawyers --

counselors, litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators - to communicate with these audiences, there can be no doubt.

I

urge you to join me in focusing the attention of the bench and
bar on the critical problem of legal communication.

Such an

effort, accomplished on your part through the publication of
articles or a symposium issue, would be in the same tradition of
service that has characterized the Cornell Law Review for threequarters of a century.

Having now had the opportunity to meet

with all of you, I am confident that the tradition will endure
and that your future will be even more glorious than your past.
Happy 75th Birthday, and Thank You.
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